On 26 September 2024, the Sudanese Armed Forces launched a large attack against positions of the Rapid Support Forces on both the eastern bank of the Nile River and its west, in the city of Omdurman. Within days, the army had taken control of a number of strategic crossings, including the Halfaya, White Nile and Salvation Bridges. This allowed it to move freely into Omdurman for the first time since losing control of the southern half of the city nearly a year ago. The army was also able to break the siege the RSF had imposed against some of its forces in the northern half of the city.
Sources told the Centre for African Security Studies that Iran had provided the army with five Mohajer-6 drones for reconnaissance and precision airstrikes at the beginning of 2024, which helped the army to make significant advances. Iran also offered the army’s chief and head of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, “unlimited” support in the form of Iranian drones of various types, munitions, and military helicopters, in exchange for a concession allowing it to establish a naval base in the Port Sudan area on the Red Sea. However, al-Burhan rejected that offer, in order to reassure both Saudi Arabia and Egypt that he would not allow Iran to use Sudanese territory to threaten their national security in the Red Sea region, and to avoid being implicated in strengthening the ability of Iran’s “axis of resistance” to target international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Shifting Course of the War
Between October 2023 to December 2023, the RSF managed to seize control of various parts of Sudan, such as southern Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, and El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. However, starting from February 2024, the Sudanese army has regained the initiative and began targeting RSF supply convoys in various parts of the country, using both Iranian drones and Turkish aircraft donated by Egypt.
With the rainy season approaching, the army escalated its operations against the RSF. It launched a military operation in Khartoum, which it then expanded to include Omdurman, the states of Sennar and Gezira, and as far as North and West Darfur. One of the army’s main achievements was its seizure in early October of the Moya mountain range in Sennar state, some 300 kilometers south of Khartoum, which links Sennar, White Nile, Gezira and Blue Nile states and opens the way towards North Kordofan state and the Darfur region in the west.
The army has also taken control of the Muqrin area in the center of Khartoum, recapturing the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan, and is close to seizing the Arabic Market area. This also places the army within reach of the New Republican Palace, the seat of the presidency.
These operations, overseen by al-Burhan and his deputy Shams al-Din al-Kabbashi, are likely to strengthen the Sovereign Council’s negotiating position against the RSF in the context of U.S. efforts since August 2024 to resume peace talks between the two parties, after American and Saudi-brokered negotiations ended in late 2023 without an agreement.
While the army has agreed to sit down again at the negotiating table, it will also seek to win further gains through military operations on the ground. It is likely that the army leadership sees its new weapons and its efforts to reorganize its ranks as an opportunity to turn the tide further in its favor, even placing it within reach of a decisive military victory over the RSF.
