Ethiopia's Amhara region is experiencing a continuation of security and military tension, amid an escalation in sporadic clashes between Ethiopian government forces and Fano fighters — a situation that reflects the central authority's failure to contain the fallout from the war that followed the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the conflict in Tigray.
The current crisis is one of the most dangerous challenges facing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government, as it directly relates to the balance of power within the Ethiopian state, the relationship between the center and the major nationalities, and its potential impact on the stability of the entire Horn of Africa.
The roots of the crisis trace back to the Tigray war of 2020–2022, during which forces and militias from the Amhara region played a leading role fighting alongside the federal army against the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
During that war, Amhara forces managed to assert control over disputed territories, particularly in western and southern Tigray, which bolstered the influence of Amhara nationalist elites within the Ethiopian political and security equation.
However, the Pretoria Agreement that ended the Tigray war generated growing discontent within Amhara nationalist circles, which came to view the federal government as beginning to make concessions at the expense of their interests — particularly regarding the future of the disputed territories and the reshaping of the balance of power within the army and the state.
The crisis deepened following the Ethiopian government's 2023 decision to disband the "regional special forces" and integrate them into federal security institutions — a decision that met with widespread rejection in Amhara, where it was seen as an attempt to weaken the region and strip it of the instruments of power it had acquired during the Tigray war.
Since then, the activity of Fano groups — decentralized armed formations comprising local and Amhara nationalist fighters — has escalated, and they have gradually become the most prominent internal security challenge facing the Ethiopian state following the abatement of the Tigray war.
In recent days, the region has seen a new escalation in clashes, particularly in areas near Gondar and Bahir Dar, where military convoys have been targeted and main roads blocked, in parallel with sweeping security campaigns conducted by the Ethiopian army. The continued limited attacks by Fano groups against government and military sites indicate that the tension is no longer merely scattered armed protest, but has become closer to a protracted, low-intensity insurgency — extended both in time and geography.
The persistence of the tension stems from several intertwined factors. Chief among them is the sense among broad segments of Amhara nationalists that the federal government is attempting to reengineer the internal balance of power following the Tigray war in ways that diminish the region's influence within the military establishment and the state.
The absence of a clear settlement for the disputed territories file with Tigray has also kept tensions alive, particularly as voices within Tigray circles have grown louder in calling for the recovery of those territories. Added to this is the continuation of the economic crisis and social pressures, which have provided a fertile environment for expanded recruitment and mobilization within the armed groups.
The tension in Amhara represents a direct challenge to Ethiopia's stability, as the region is among the most politically, militarily, and demographically significant in the country. The continuation of the clashes is also draining the Ethiopian army, which has not fully recovered from the Tigray war, and is limiting the government's capacity to impose stability in other areas.
Most importantly, the current crisis directly affects the Tigray region, as any new escalation in Amhara could push toward the reactivation of old military alignments between Amhara nationalists and the TPLF — particularly given the fragility of the Pretoria Agreement and the continuation of political and security tensions within Tigray itself.
The tension also carries important regional dimensions, as Eritrea is closely monitoring developments given its complex relationship with both Amhara and Tigray and the Ethiopian government. Asmara is believed to view the continuation of internal divisions within Ethiopia as a factor that limits Addis Ababa's ability to transform into a dominant regional power.
Neighboring countries, particularly Sudan, fear that the continuation of the tension could trigger new waves of displacement or expand armed activity near the borders — at a time when Sudan is already suffering from a widespread internal war. Any further fragmentation within Ethiopia will also directly affect the security of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, given the increasing interconnection of the region's crises.
In light of current dynamics, the most likely scenario appears to be the continuation of a state of "mutual attrition" between the Ethiopian army and Fano groups, with neither side capable of achieving a decisive victory. The government holds a clear military superiority, but faces difficulty in ending the insurgency due to its local and decentralized nature.
The most dangerous scenario, however, involves the widening of tensions toward a multi-front confrontation encompassing Amhara, Tigray, and possibly regional parties indirectly — particularly if the Pretoria Agreement collapses or the conflict over the disputed territories intensifies.
A de-escalation scenario remains possible, but would require a broader political settlement that restructures the relationship between the federal government and the regions — something for which the indicators are not clearly in place at the current stage.
