The African Sahel region is transforming at an accelerating pace into an arena of complex geopolitical and economic conflict, where the rivalry between Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara goes beyond ideological disagreements to become a comprehensive war over resources and tribal loyalties.
This conflict manifests clearly across a wide geographical scope stretching from northern Mali, through the border areas of "Liptako-Gourma" between Niger and Burkina Faso, and extending to the fringes of northern Benin, where weak borders intertwine with smuggling networks and traditional pastoral routes, creating an ideal environment for the growth of a war economy.
Control over the "shadow economy" represents the primary driver of this conflict, as the organisations seek to dominate trans-Saharan smuggling routes, particularly those passing through cities such as Gao and Kidal in northern Mali, and extending to the corridors leading toward Libya and Algeria.
These routes carry not only illicit goods such as drugs, weapons and cigarettes, but have become vital financial arteries enabling armed groups to impose levies and regulate informal commercial movement. Regions such as Tillabéri and Soum have also emerged as centres of intense activity, where smuggling routes intersect with security flashpoints.
Alongside this, artisanal gold mining has emerged as a strategic funding source, particularly in areas such as Kayes and northern Burkina Faso's Sahel region, where armed groups impose their control over traditional mines and levy "protection dues" on local workers.
These substantial financial revenues, which are subject to no oversight, grant the organisations a growing capacity to purchase weapons and recruit fighters, reinforcing the cycle of violence and holding the local economy hostage to the authority of the de facto power.
In this context, tribal balances play a pivotal role in shaping the trajectories of the conflict. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin employs a strategy of "containment", through social integration with tribes such as the Fulani, the Tuareg and the Arabs, and presenting itself as a protector of their interests in local disputes.
For example, in central Mali, particularly in the Mopti region, the group exploited tensions between the Fulani and the agricultural Dogon communities, providing support to the Fulani who felt marginalised, which granted it a cohesive social base.
In contrast, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara pursues a method of "revolutionisation", recruiting marginalised youth, particularly from the Fulani, and inciting them against traditional leaderships, thereby dismantling the tribal structure from within. This pattern has manifested in areas such as Ménaka, where clashes broke out between factions loyal to the Islamic State and others linked to al-Qaeda, intertwined with local disputes over influence and resources.
This ethnic polarisation has led to entire communities being branded as terrorist, particularly the Fulani in several regions, which pushed other tribes such as the Dogon or certain Tuareg groups to form self-defence militias. As a result, the conflict has gradually shifted from a confrontation between the state and armed groups to intercommunal disputes of an ethnic character, as occurred in the mutual massacres witnessed in areas of central Mali and northern Burkina Faso.
This landscape intersects with the natural resource crisis exacerbated by climate change, where desertification and declining rainfall have reduced grazing areas and water sources.
In regions such as Tillabéri and the border areas with Burkina Faso, control over wells and pastoral routes has become a matter of life or death, which has driven jihadist groups to exploit this reality by enabling tribes loyal to them to access these resources, in exchange for loyalty and support.
This linkage between "the gun" and "securing livelihoods" has made membership in these organisations an economic and social choice, and not merely an ideological one. With the withdrawal or reduction of international forces' presence, these groups have emerged as alternative authorities managing local markets, imposing "compulsory zakat", and adjudicating disputes, reinforcing their presence as a substitute for the state in marginalised areas.
In light of this reality, attention turns to attempts at southward expansion toward the Gulf of Guinea states, particularly Benin and Togo, where these organisations seek access to maritime outlets and new markets. This potential expansion threatens not only to transfer violence, but also to transfer the model of the "war economy" based on the exploitation of resources and tribal divisions, which portends the widening of instability into regions that were until recently considered more stable.
