Islamic State Steps up Activity in Mozambique

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Islamic State Steps up Activity in Mozambique

Islamic State Steps up Activity in Mozambique

Since late 2023, the Islamic State group has dramatically stepped up its attacks in Mozambique’s north-eastern province of Cabo Delgado. It doubled its operations in November month alone, compared to previous months of 2023.

From the start of February 2024, IS attacks were more numerous and took place across a wider geographical area, but especially focused on the Chiure region of southern Cabo Delgado province, where the group took control of several towns and villages, massacred civilians, and burned dozens of schools and churches, leading to a large wave of displacement towards the southern provincial capital Pemba.

A government source told the Center for African Security Studies that more than 300 people had been killed in the fighting, most of them civilians, and that by mid-March 2024, more than 100,000 people had been displaced.

The official said around 500 IS gunmen had taken part in the recent attacks, most of them armed with light weapons (grenades, Kalashnikov assault rifles, PKC machine guns and rocket propelled grenades) and riding motorbikes, or cars mounted with medium machine guns.

Why is ISIS focusing on Chiure?

The recent successes of IS in Capo Delgado are the result of the organization’s efforts in the province since 2017, but the latest attacks were a major escalation. The Christian community was the main target in the attacks, a dynamic which has important humanitarian and security implications.

It is likely that IS attacks on Christian towns specifically had two main objectives: to seize control of the main roads connecting Chiure to other parts of Cabo Delgado province, along with the coastal roads that lead to Pemba; and to escalate sectarian tensions in the region in order to stir further chaos and violence.

Although Mozambique as a whole has a Catholic Christian majority, the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado have Muslim majorities of 61% and 55%, respectively. IS has historically been limited to the northernmost areas of Cabo Delgado, so it is likely to continue its attacks against Christian-majority areas of the province. That said, IS was able to attack Chiure because the district is close to the group’s main areas of deployment. If IS were to seize Chiure, it would likely then advance on coastal areas such as Pemba, or into Muslim-majority areas such as Muidumbe, Mueda and Namuno.

Of course, these attacks have many direct repercussions. The most important is the increased pressure of refugees on the central government and on provinces adjacent to where those displaced originated. IS controls the centers of four out of Capo Delgado’s 17 districts, namely: Palma, Quisanga, Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia.

It is also working to strengthen its presence on the Macomia and Chiure areas. If it were to take control of these two areas, this would spark further waves of displacement towards other areas. Indeed, this has already happened in the most recent attacks, in which thousands of civilians were displaced from their villages towards the coastal area of Pemba and the western areas of Capo Delgado. Such dynamics will escalate the ongoing humanitarian crisis, given the struggle to secure basic food needs and create temporary camps for the displaced. A large exodus would also help IS to take control of the abandoned villages and towns.

What next after the capture of Quisanga?

While IS in Mozambique has been able to recruit hundreds of new members since 2017, it needs this dynamic to continue if it is to carry on its expansion in the province. Controlling Christian towns in the region and winning victories that can serve as propaganda against the marginalization of Muslims will help it attract more young fighters into its ranks. This is reflected in organization’s distribution of paper pamphlets in Muslim villages, urging residents to pledge allegiance to it. A speech by one of the group’s senior clerics after the capture of Quisanga, in which he urged people to join the group, is another indicator of this tendency.

The group’s move on Quisanga came amid its efforts to expand its influence along the Indian Ocean coast. IS launched this strategy in August 2020, when it took control of the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia, and although government forces recaptured the town in early 2021, IS has remained deployed nearby and continued its efforts secure full control of it in the future.

The group has also escalated attacks against Christian villages, with the aim of cutting roads linking them to coastal cities as part of its drive to take control of the entire coast of the province. If it were to achieve this at some point in the future, it could potentially threaten shipping along the entire Mozambique Channel.

In the same context, the group’s expansion of control over new areas and new roads also boosts its financial revenues, whether through taxes on goods and crops (especially cashew nuts), fisheries and even gold mining operations, or by imposing transit fees on commercial trucks. The group is estimated to impose taxes of about 150,000 metical—about $2,340—for the passage of each truck.

 

 



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