The United Arab Emirates’ influence in Tunisia dates back to shortly after the 2011 overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In the aftermath of his fall, the Gulf state began building a strong network of influence in the North African country. The United Arab Emirates’ influence in Tunisia dates back to shortly after the 2011 overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In the aftermath of his fall, the Gulf state began building a strong network of influence in the North African country.
The United Arab Emirates’ influence in Tunisia dates back to shortly after the 2011 overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In the aftermath of his fall, the Gulf state began building a strong network of influence in the North African country. It has since sought to infiltrate the Tunisian state at multiple levels, up to and including the presidential palace in Carthage, where it has gone as far as planting cells to spy on top Tunisian officials. This has continued into the era of current President Kais Saied.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had been involved in Tunisia well prior to the revolution, wielding political influence through the economy but taking little interest in Tunisia’s domestic affairs. The revolution and Ben Ali’s overthrow prompted the UAE to intervene too, but as part of a grand regional strategy of supporting counter-revolutions in the backlash against the Arab Spring. Abu Dhabi went beyond offering financial support, infiltrating state organs in various countries to achieve its goals.
The Center for African Security Studies has seen information confirming that the UAE used its relations with Iran and France to build its influence in Tunisia. Sources confirm that it has coordinated with both countries in regard to terrorist groups and assassinations in recent years.
Emirati Infiltration Methods
According to these sources, the UAE has sought to further the Tunisian counter-revolution by infiltrating key political families, as well as targeting Tunisian leftist movements. Abu Dhabi also successfully penetrated the tactical media apparatus of the Tunisian National Guard’s anti-terrorism unit, in cooperation with France and Iran, as well as the leadership of the Tunisian security and army apparatus, through recruitment, buying loyalty and financing unions in order to infiltrate them too.
As the years went on, the UAE began entrusting its agents with the task of building a privileged security relationship with Tunisia. Emirati-based Palestinian leader Muhammad Dahlan has visited Tunisia at least three times, staying on the island of Djerba and working on Tunisia and Libya. Abu Dhabi also supported the election campaign of current president Kais Saied, in coordination with its allies. People with knowledge of the issue indicate that Kais Saied was groomed by France and Iran for years before becoming a candidate for Tunisia’s presidency.
Espionage in Carthage
The UAE has worked hard to penetrate all levels of the Tunisian state apparatus, especially the presidential palace, with the aim of monitoring developments from behind the scenes and heading off any action that would threaten its own influence, even by its allies—especially as Qais Saied, according to sources close to him, is closer to Iran than to the UAE.
Security sources told the Center for African Security Studies that Egypt had asked the UAE to manage its affairs in Tunisia after the coup led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2014. This appears to be linked to reports that Algeria applied pressure to rein in the UAE’s influence in Tunisia. Algeria and Egypt consider see each other as competitors in North Africa. Cairo and Abu Dhabi engaged in high-level coordination over Tunisia, and Egypt gave a green light and even supported Dahlan’s activities in the North African country, in order to facilitate this security and military infiltration, while Emirati funding for infiltrating Tunisian state agencies passed through Egypt.
In late 2023, Tunisian security sources confirmed that a UAE-affiliated espionage cell had been uncovered in the heart of the Presidential Palace, in the Tunisian suburb of Carthage. It appears that Algerian pressure may have led to the cell’s members being arrested and a blockade being imposed on some elements of Emirati influence in Tunisia—or that the UAE and Tunisia may have fallen into a dispute over the cell’s activities.
Overlapping Possibilities
The suspension of an Emirati spy ring operating in the Carthage Palace carries has various repercussions. It may indicate that President Saied has changed his stance towards Emirati influence.
It is certain that the exposure of the UAE’s cell will increase Emirati suspicions towards Saied himself and perhaps towards its other allies in Tunisia. The move may therefore be seen as a prelude to Emirati influence in Tunisia being shut down as the regional balance of power is redrawn. Abu Dhabi may therefore seek to offset the anger in some parts of Tunisian society towards Emirati influence, and try to redress its position.
The UAE is unlikely to ignore Algerian anger at its influence in Tunisia. It will however take into account reports that Saudi Arabia wants to limit the UAE’s role in Algeria, in exchange for economic support equivalent to four times the UAE’s investments in the country.
