On January 23, the Malian army announced it had killed senior Islamic State group commander Abdoul Wahab Ould Choghib and 14 of his fellow fighters in an attack on his headquarters near the southeastern city of Ménaka.
Sources confirmed to the Center for African Security Studies that Mali had carried out the attack on the base in the town of Inarabane on January 21, in coordination with Burkina Faso, using Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. Inarabane, 60 kilometers southwest of Ménaka and close to the Burkinabe border, is one of the jihadist group’s most important strongholds in the region.
Escalation, Counter-Escalation
Jihadist organizations have dramatically stepped up their attacks in the Sahel countries over recent months. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso appear set to see further escalation and deterioration in the security situation, judging from the dynamics in jihadist attacks throughout 2023 and since the start of 2024. Mali and Burkina Faso, particularly, are seeking to strike back at these organizations through security cooperation with outside forces—notably the Russian paramilitary Wagner group in Mali.
Malian sources familiar with IS activities in the country indicate that Ould Choghib was the group’s Emir (top commander) in the Ménaka region and oversaw its expansion there between 2022 and 2023, in which hundreds of civilians were killed in dozens of attacks against villages and towns close to Malian army positions.
Ould Choghib had built his personal influence on being a major arms supplier, capable of securing weapons from several sources including through smuggling networks connected to southern Libya, or at inflated prices from certain Malian army divisions or Azawadi (separatist Tuareg) groups in northern Mali, which in turn receive much of their support from the Algerian security services.
His killing was one of a string of operations against senior IS military figures in Mali, starting in December 2023. They included Larbi Bey Adel, Ibrahim Abela Hakou, whose killings were confirmed, as well as Osama Jalou and Adamu Jalou, whose fates are unknown.
Ould Choghib’s killing, however, is likely to have a greater impact than these previous killings, given his position and his role as the mastermind of IS plans in the region.
Cooperation Scenarios
Defense cooperation between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, along with Turkish security involvement, could lead to the formation of a tripartite alliance against jihadist organizations in the Sahel. The operations cited above reflect a broader strategy of targeting jihadist leaders with the aim of breaking up the structures they command and pushing back their territorial gains.
Türkiye’s security presence in the region may expand in the near term, and its success in supporting tactical assassinations of jihadist leaders could help governments in the region seize back territory from them as well as beginning to dismantle jihadist command structures. This could open the door for Türkiye to engage in wider security cooperation with African countries moving forward.
