On May 20, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Front for the Victory of Islam and Muslims (known by its Arabic acronym JNIM) attacked an army barracks in southwestern Niger, near the border with Mali. The attack marked a major escalation that threatened to terminate an implicit truce in place since July 2022.
The operation, in the Boni district of Tillaberi region, came in a context of escalating tensions throughout the Sahel region, following a string of military coups d’état, mounting attacks by various jihadist groups, and operations by Azawadi Tuareg separatists to seize back territory in northeastern Mali which they had lost to the Malian army, which is backed by Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group.
The United Arab Emirates has reportedly asked Alghabass Ag Intalla, the head of the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), to encourage JNIM in the Ségou region of Mali’s Mopti state, close to where the Islamic State group is active to infiltrate IS-held areas in the Tillaberi region, close to Niger’s capital, Niamey.
Ag Intalla is a former leader of Ansar Dine, one component of JNIM, but he left the jihadist group to join the Azawadi coordination under a new formation, HCUA, reportedly under instructions from the UAE, so that any support the latter extended to either of the groups could be passed off as humanitarian work and support for Azawadi political movements.
The move has many potential implications, but the main conclusion is that the UAE is attempting to stir up chaos in the region in order consolidate its presence there. Abu Dhabi also wants to support its ally in Niger, coup leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani, by keeping IS as far from the capital Niamey as possible and opening the way for the Nigerien army to purge the group from areas near the border with Mali—with indirect assistance in the form of Ansar Dine, a JNIM affiliate, attacking areas where IS is present and pressuring it to withdraw.
It is notable that IS had attacked the same army base on August 15 last year, killing about 20 Nigerien troops and wounding 17 others. The organization then expanded southwards and westwards, into the Liptako-Gourma region where the Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger borders meet. The situation in this region poses a growing threat to all three countries, but especially Niger, whose capital Niamey is relatively close to IS-held areas near the border.
Therefore, the Nigerien army’s failure to clear IS from the area, as well as attacks in the same region by Al-Qaeda affiliates, suggest that the latter are attempting to take full advantage of the freedom of movement they currently enjoy. It remains to be seen whether these groups will withdraw, or whether Niger’s army will retake control of these territories. Either case would reflect weakness on the part of IS and its relative decline compared to Al-Qaeda.
No Response from IS
At the time of writing, IS had not responded to the Boni attack. This could have several explanations. Firstly, the group may be preparing its own response in a strategic location, which—regardless of whether it fails or succeeds—would not reflect on its capabilities and presence in the region. Furthermore, the recent pattern of IS attacks suggest that it is focusing its efforts on eastern Mali and eastern Niger, meaning it may wish to delay any confrontation with JNIM and its allies.
It is also possible that IS had anticipated an operation of this type by its jihadist rivals in the region. Tribal sources could have informed IS commanders as to why the UAE had sought to incite JNIM to drop the implicit truce between the two groups and provoke them to fight each other. This suggests that IS is now re-assessing the negative repercussions to its presence in the region were it to respond to the JNIM attack now, prompting it instead to be patient and refrain from responding until the time is ripe.
