Despite the efforts made by the government of the Central African Republic in recent years to reassert its authority with the support of external partners, the security situation outside the capital Bangui remains highly fragile, reflecting a persistent gap between central authority and ground realities across most of the country's provinces. Although large-scale confrontations have diminished compared to the years of civil war, large parts of the country continue to fall under the influence of local armed groups, criminal networks, or de facto authorities, which limits the government's capacity to enforce the law or deliver basic services. Moreover, Bangui's growing dependence on external military support, set against the weakness of national security institutions, renders any security improvements vulnerable to reversal should the balance of external support shift or competition among local actors intensify.
One of the most prominent manifestations of this fragility is the continued presence of armed groups in the northern, eastern, and central regions, where these groups control trade routes, mining areas, and natural resources, imposing illegal levies on local populations — thereby securing independent sources of financing outside state structures.
Although government forces have succeeded in retaking some towns in recent years, control has generally been confined to urban centres, while surrounding rural areas remain beyond government reach. This allows armed actors to regroup and launch sporadic attacks against government forces or civilians.
The weak deployment of armed forces further deepens the security crisis. The army continues to suffer from limited human and logistical capacity, as well as insufficient deployment across remote provinces, forcing heavy reliance on foreign forces and private military companies to secure many critical areas.
This reality weakens the state's image as the sole guarantor of security, and raises questions about the sustainability of security gains should this external support diminish.
Natural resources stand out as one of the most significant drivers of continued instability. The Central African Republic holds substantial reserves of gold, diamonds, and timber, yet a large number of production sites are located in areas the government struggles to access. Armed groups compete for control over these resources as a primary source of funding, which transforms the conflict from a political dispute into a war economy built on the exploitation of natural wealth — and makes ending the conflict considerably more complex.
The security challenges are compounded by the country's geography and its long borders with six states: Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These borders provide a conducive environment for the movement of fighters and the smuggling of weapons and illicit goods, given the government's limited capacity to monitor them. Security crises in Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also amplify pressure on the Central African Republic, whether through refugee flows or the cross-border movement of armed groups.
Peace agreements concluded over recent years have, on the other hand, been unable to fully address the structural causes of the conflict. They have often focused on power-sharing arrangements or the integration of some armed factions, without achieving meaningful progress in reforming state institutions or extending government administration to peripheral areas. The fragmentation of certain armed factions and the emergence of new groups have also perpetuated the fragile security environment, even as the scale of major military operations has diminished.
Nor can the security landscape be separated from the growing international competition inside the country. Russia has reinforced its political and military presence in recent years by providing training and security support to the government, while the United Nations and the European Union continue to implement programmes in support of security institutions and capacity-building.
Although this support has contributed to improvements in the capital and some major cities, it has not yet succeeded in building a national security architecture capable of independently imposing stability. The multiplicity of external actors also occasionally generates divergences in priorities and working methods.
At the domestic level, economic and humanitarian conditions continue to represent a principal factor in sustaining instability. Weak development, high rates of poverty and unemployment, and the absence of government services together create a fertile environment for the recruitment of young people into armed groups. The continued internal displacement further exacerbates social pressures and limits the government's capacity to reintegrate communities affected by the conflict.
The security situation outside the capital is likely to remain fragile in the coming period, even if relative calm persists within Bangui. The absence of full government control over the provinces, the persistence of the war economy, and the interplay of internal factors with regional and international interventions all make the current stability limited and vulnerable to reversal.
Achieving durable stability therefore requires a transition away from a purely military approach toward a comprehensive strategy encompassing security sector reform, the strengthening of local governance, development of peripheral regions, tighter border controls, and the launch of economic programmes that reduce the population's dependence on the armed groups' economy — thereby contributing to the restoration of the state's monopoly on the use of force and the consolidation of its presence across the country.
