West Africa is witnessing an accelerating security transformation, manifested in the shift of jihadist activity from the traditional Sahel states towards the Gulf of Guinea countries — a development regarded as one of the most dangerous security shifts on the African continent in recent years. After the focal point of the threat remained concentrated in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have begun expanding the scope of their operations southward towards Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana, exploiting the fragility of border areas and the weak government presence in some peripheral regions.
This expansion is primarily linked to the successes achieved by the al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin in consolidating its influence within Mali, Burkina Faso, and parts of Niger. Rather than limiting itself to controlling areas within the Sahel states, the group has adopted a strategy of gradual expansion towards coastal regions, whether through carrying out sporadic attacks or building local networks for recruitment, logistical support, and smuggling.
The danger of this transformation lies in the fact that the Gulf of Guinea states differ fundamentally from the Sahel states in terms of population density, economic importance, and vital infrastructure. These countries host major ports and trade networks that represent an economic lifeline for all of West Africa. Consequently, any widespread security deterioration within them will not be limited in its impact to border areas, but could extend to regional trade, foreign investment, and maritime transport.
In recent years, Benin and Togo have recorded a notable rise in the number of armed attacks originating from border areas with Burkina Faso. Likewise, some northern regions of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have witnessed increasing activity by smuggling and recruitment networks linked to extremist groups.
Although these countries still maintain higher levels of stability compared to the Sahel states, security indicators suggest that jihadist groups are seeking to establish a long-term foothold rather than limiting themselves to temporary infiltration operations.
These groups benefit from a combination of factors that facilitate their expansion, most notably the weak economic development in border areas, the existence of local disputes between pastoral and agricultural communities, and the difficulty of monitoring borders that stretch across vast territories.
Furthermore, traditional smuggling networks that are active in transporting fuel, goods, and weapons provide a suitable environment for the movement of armed elements and facilitate financing and supply operations.
In response, the Gulf of Guinea states have taken a series of preventive measures over recent years, including reinforcing military deployment in northern regions, developing intelligence cooperation with regional and international partners, and increasing investment in local development programmes.
However, a military approach alone will not be sufficient to contain the threat, particularly since the Sahel experience has shown that the absence of development and government services provides a fertile environment for attracting new recruits.
The repercussions of this expansion extend beyond the immediate security dimension, as the continued southward jihadist pressure may lead to a redrawing of the threat map in West Africa. Rather than armed groups being concentrated in remote desert areas, the densely populated and economically significant coastal regions may become part of the security operational theatre — something that will multiply the cost of confrontation for local governments and their international partners.
In the near term, it does not appear that jihadist groups possess the capacity for the kind of broad territorial control within the Gulf of Guinea states that occurred in parts of the Sahel. Nevertheless, their capacity to wear down government forces and undermine local stability is set to increase. The principal challenge therefore facing the states of the region is to prevent the northern border areas from being transformed into permanent staging bases for armed groups, before the experience witnessed by the Sahel states over the past decade is repeated.
