Recent developments in Burkina Faso point to the possibility that the country is entering a new phase of internal tension — one that transcends the traditional confrontation between the state and extremist organisations to encompass growing friction between the ruling military council and certain religious and social constituencies that, until recently, were considered part of the environment supportive of the authorities.
The case of the arrest of preacher Mohamed Ishaq Kindo and the protests and heightened security measures that followed stands out as a significant indicator of this shift. The arrest triggered widespread protests in Ouagadougou and a number of other cities, and prompted the authorities to close the Grand Sunni Mosque in the capital and detain dozens of demonstrators under the pretext of maintaining public order.
The significance of this crisis lies in the fact that Kindo is not classified among the radical figures in opposition to the military council; rather, he is regarded within Sunni religious circles as a moderate preacher of broad influence. His arrest has therefore created a perception among a segment of his supporters that the current security crackdown targets not only extremist discourse, but also religious figures who enjoy a popular base independent of the authorities.
This has led the Sunni movement in Burkina Faso to engage in negotiations with the authorities demanding his release, while simultaneously calling for de-escalation and urging against any unauthorised mobilisation.
Conversely, the military council led by Ibrahim Traoré appears to view the matter through a broader security lens. Since 2022, the authorities have adopted an approach based on expanding the powers of the security agencies and mobilising society in the war against armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The authorities have also moved to impose increasing restrictions on political parties, civil organisations, and student unions, on the grounds that unity of the home front represents a priority given the prevailing security challenges.
The continuation of this policy is likely to produce counterproductive results in the medium term. Rather than reinforcing stability, arrest operations may push new segments of youth toward adopting more hostile stances vis-à-vis the state. The calls that have begun to emerge for the formation of armed groups to confront the security forces represent a troubling development — not because they currently pose a direct threat to the military council, but because they could lead to a multiplication of focal points of violence within the country and to a weakening of the military effort directed against extremist organisations.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of these calls translating into a large-scale insurgency remains limited at the current stage. The security services still maintain firm control over the capital and the main urban centres, and the official Sunni movement itself continues to espouse a discourse calling for de-escalation and dialogue rather than armed confrontation.
The greater danger, however, lies in the erosion of the military council's social legitimacy within certain circles that had previously been supportive of it. The challenge facing the regime today is not limited to combating armed groups; it also encompasses the preservation of its internal alliances.
If the arrests and closures of religious institutions continue and compulsory mobilisation measures expand, the authorities may find themselves facing a broader wave of popular discontent that cannot be contained by security means alone.
Accordingly, the most probable scenario over the coming weeks involves the continuation of negotiations to reach a settlement with preacher Kindo and the leadership of the Sunni movement, in exchange for the imposition of additional restrictions on certain religious institutions.
The more dangerous scenario involves the failure of these negotiations and the continuation of arrests and forced conscription — a course of events that could push local youth groups to shift from civil protest toward limited forms of armed resistance, thereby opening a new internal front at a time when the state is still grappling with major security challenges across most of the country.
