The Sahel region has witnessed, over the past two years, a rapidly accelerating transformation in the map of international influence, with the growing Russian presence in the three Alliance of Sahel States: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
This expansion comes in the wake of a series of military coups that the three countries witnessed between 2020 and 2023, and the subsequent deterioration of relations with France and other Western partners — which prompted the new governments to seek alternative security and political partners capable of supporting their survival and confronting the escalating armed threats.
The shift began in a clear fashion in Mali following the deterioration of relations between Bamako and Paris, with the pace of cooperation with the Russian Wagner Group accelerating from late 2021. With the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023 and the restructuring of Russian activities in Africa, the management of many security files passed to the Africa Corps — a formation directly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defence that works to expand Russian influence across the continent.
Mali has become one of the most important theatres of activity for this new formation, whether through training, operational support, or the provision of protection for certain vital installations.
In Burkina Faso, the Russian presence has been markedly reinforced since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power in September 2022. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Ouagadougou intensified its military cooperation with Moscow — including the acquisition of military equipment, drones, and surveillance systems. The country also witnessed mutual visits between military officials from both sides, as part of a broader orientation toward diversifying security partners and reducing dependence on traditional Western support.
In Niger, the Russian presence gained particular momentum following the July 2023 coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. With the withdrawal of French forces during 2024 and the subsequent reduction of the American military presence, Niamey opened the door to greater security cooperation with Moscow. In April 2024, the first groups of Russian military advisers arrived in the country, followed by shipments of military equipment and air defence systems. By 2026, Russia had become one of the most prominent security partners of the Nigerien military authorities.
These transformations accelerated with the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States grouping Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — which transformed in July 2024 into a political and security confederation seeking to strengthen defence and economic cooperation among the three countries. Moscow found in this new regional framework an opportunity to expand its presence collectively, rather than dealing with each country separately.
The Russian expansion rests on a set of integrated tools. At the military level, Moscow provides training, advisory support, and weapons — including drones, helicopters, and reconnaissance systems. At the political level, it presents itself as a partner that does not attach its assistance to conditions related to political reform or human rights — an approach that attracts many military regimes in the region. At the media level, recent years have witnessed growing activity by platforms and media networks promoting the Russian narrative within the Sahel states.
However, this expansion faces growing challenges. Despite the growth in military cooperation, armed groups linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda remain capable of carrying out large-scale attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The recent attacks in Niger in June 2026, which targeted military bases and sensitive installations, demonstrated that the security threat remains far from fully contained, notwithstanding the shifts in external partnerships.
While Moscow has succeeded in strengthening its political and military presence, field indicators do not yet show a decisive decline in armed group activity. On the contrary, some areas of the Sahel have witnessed an escalation of attacks and a widening in the scope of armed operations over the past two years.
Beyond this, the Russian expansion is generating concern among Western powers, who regard the Sahel as having become one of the new arenas of geopolitical competition. After decades of French dominance over security arrangements in the region, Moscow now holds growing influence within the three capitals, while other states — such as Turkey, China, and the UAE — are seeking to strengthen their economic and security presence to varying degrees.
The Russian presence is likely to continue expanding in the foreseeable future, particularly given the persistence of tensions between the Alliance of Sahel States and the West, and the continued need of the military governments for rapid security support to counter armed threats. Yet the future of this influence will remain contingent on Moscow's ability and that of its local partners to achieve tangible results in combating armed groups and improving security conditions.
Accordingly, the growing Russian presence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger does not merely reflect a change in military partnerships; it represents a broader shift in the geopolitical balances within West Africa. The Sahel today is witnessing a reshaping of its security and regional architecture, amid the decline of traditional Western influence and the rise of new international actors seeking to consolidate their positions in one of the continent's most important and sensitive regions.
