South Sudan is currently experiencing a phase of fragile relative stability, yet security and political indicators over recent months suggest that the factors of instability which led to the civil war have not been fully addressed.
Although the revitalized peace agreement remains in effect, implementation of many of its core provisions continues to lag, particularly with regard to security sector reform, the unification of the armed forces, and the completion of the transitional arrangements — keeping the prospects of renewed tensions alive to varying degrees.
One of the most prominent weaknesses lies in the slow implementation of the transitional security arrangements. Years after the agreement was signed, the process of integrating the forces of the various parties into a unified national military institution still faces financial, logistical, and political difficulties.
Likewise, the continued existence of armed formations under multiple command structures reduces the state's ability to monopolize the use of force, and keeps the prospects of local friction or military splits alive whenever a political crisis arises.
At the same time, the government faces mounting economic pressures as a result of declining oil revenues, which represent the main source of public income.
Disruptions to oil exports in past periods, combined with regional economic challenges, have reduced the government's ability to fund security and military institutions and pay salaries on a regular basis. Historically, economic crises in South Sudan have been a contributing factor in escalating tensions among political and military elites, given the links between local networks of influence and the distribution of government resources.
The domestic political environment also remains marked by a degree of uncertainty. Although the formal partnership between President Salva Kiir and his First Vice President Riek Machar continues within the transitional governing institutions, the roots of the political disputes between the two sides have not entirely disappeared.
Past experience shows that political understandings in South Sudan often remain tied to personal balances among leaders rather than to stable institutions capable of managing disputes on a lasting basis.
In addition, local tensions of a tribal and communal nature persist in a number of states. Disputes over land, grazing land, water resources, and cattle theft continue to represent a constant source of local violence. These disputes frequently intersect with political and military divisions, giving them security dimensions broader than mere limited communal disagreements.
The security equation is also affected by surrounding regional developments. The ongoing war in Sudan places direct pressure on South Sudan through refugee flows, the disruption of certain economic routes, and a heightened risk of weapons smuggling across the border. Any further deterioration in the situation in Sudan could also be reflected in the security balances within South Sudan, given the tribal, economic, and geographic ties between the two countries.
On the other hand, there are factors that limit the likelihood of a slide into a full-scale civil war in the near term. Most of the major political and military forces are aware of the scale of losses the country suffered during the previous years of conflict, and there remains a continuous presence of regional and international organizations engaged in monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.
Likewise, the main parties continue to benefit politically and economically from the survival of the current transitional governance framework, making them less inclined to risk a comprehensive confrontation.
Nevertheless, the most likely risk does not lie in the sudden outbreak of a broad national war, but rather in the continuation of a pattern of scattered local tensions, or limited clashes between armed factions or local forces in certain fragile areas. Such incidents could escalate into a broader crisis if they coincide with an internal political crisis, a sharp economic downturn, or further setbacks in the implementation of the peace agreement.
Accordingly, it can be assessed that South Sudan will remain, in the period ahead, in a middle zone between full peace and open conflict. The state does not currently face decisive indicators of a return to full-scale civil war, but at the same time it has not yet succeeded in building the security and political institutions capable of permanently preventing the return of tensions. Stability will therefore persist, but it will remain a fragile stability that depends to a great extent on the continuation of the current political balances and the avoidance of major internal or regional shocks.
