On September 27, Benin announced it had arrested several senior public figures accused of attempting to overthrow President Patrice Talon. The Prosecutor of the Economic Crimes and Terrorism Court said Republican Guard commander Col. Djimon Dieudonne Tevoedjre had been detained along with former sports minister Oswald Homeky and Olivier Boko, a businessman close to Talon.
Sources told the Center for African Security Studies that Boko, with Homeky’s mediation, had convinced Tevoedjre to launch the coup in exchange for 1.5 billion CFA francs (about two million euros).
All three figures were seen as close to Talon, but suspicions of a coup attempt had started to circulate in early August 2024, when both Homeky and Boko opened bank accounts with NSIA Bank in Côte d’Ivoire in Tevoedjre’s name, with an initial balance of 105 million CFA francs. A further 129 deposits followed, in the form of cash transported in Toyota Land Cruisers owned by former minister Homeky.
Who Instigated the Coup Attempt?
Boko was arrested by members of Benin’s anti-crime squad on the night of September 23, as he and his wife were on their way to the president’s residence in Benin to attend a dinner party.
Boko, a businessman and owner of Dfa, a food supply firm, has no official role in government, but he has been dubbed Benin’s “vice president” since Talon took power in 2016, and has been his economic advisor for 20 years.
The relationship between the two men had begun to deteriorate when Boko announced in July 2023 that he wanted to succeed President Talon, whose current term expires in 2026. Boko made several media appearances in which he made clear his political ambitions and his desire to improve relations with post-coup authorities in neighboring Niger, as well as with Russia.
In October 2023, Homeky resigned as sports minister and declared his support for Boko’s bid to succeed Talon, who cannot run for a third term in 2026 under the current constitution.
Sources told CASS that President Talon had asked Boko not to enter the world of politics, and to drop his bid for power as Talon’s successor; he also confided in the tycoon that he was thinking of amending the constitution in order to extend his own term in power.
Aware of these tensions, Homeky convinced Boko that it would be feasible to carry out a military coup against Talon, establish a transitional council with Boko at its head, and hold a presidential election in 2026, guaranteeing that Boko would win it. The two men then set their plan in motion by convincing Tevoedjre—whose Republican Guard is tasked with protecting the president—to carry out the coup in exchange for large sums of money and promises of a senior position in the army throughout the transitional period and beyond.
Regional Implications
If the coup in Benin had succeeded, it would have had major implications for U.S. strategy in the region. It could quite possibly have pushed Washington to withdraw its forces from Benin and cut off military and security cooperation with the country, in echoes of similar scenarios in Mali and Niger.
It should be noted that the U.S. has been making concerted efforts to bolster Benin against security threats, both by including the country in its Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS, which builds on the 2019 the Global Fragility Act), and through assistance provided by the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
All these are helping Benin to finance its security forces and bolster the government’s presence and enhance stability in the north of the country. U.S. financing has also helped the country expand Parakou Airport in central Benin, improving its runways and building secure hangars for U.S. military aircraft and shelters for U.S. helicopters which are to be stationed there.
The July 2023 coup in neighboring Niger led to the country announcing it would cease cooperation with the U.S. military in October 2023. Niamey then cancelled defense deals with Washington in March 2024 and ordered American forces to leave its territory in August 2024. It has concurrently strengthened its cooperation with other countries, most notably Russia and Türkiye.
Similarly, the coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021 and in Burkina Faso in 2022 brought to power military councils hostile to the U.S., former colonial power France, and the West in general. These councils have since rolled back their military and intelligence cooperation with these powers, in favor of Russia and its Africa Corps (formerly known as the Wagner Group).
Therefore, the U.S. sees its presence in Benin as an essential pillar of its efforts in the Gulf of Guinea region to monitor jihadist groups in the Sahel region, on the one hand, and the regional activities of U.S. rivals such as China, Russia, and Türkiye on the other.
As successive coups in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have destabilized the region, the U.S. is finding itself forced to strengthen its military and diplomatic presence in relatively stable countries such as Benin. Washington may therefore have played a role in thwarting the elite coup attempt there, as any change in the political system could have forced the U.S. to withdraw from there too. Such a development Would have opened the way for other powers such as Russia and China to fill the vacuum, again redrawing the map of alliances in the region to Washington’s disadvantage.
