Libya has been experiencing, for several months now, a state of relative security calm compared to earlier phases of conflict. Yet this calm does not necessarily reflect lasting stability so much as it expresses a fragile equilibrium among the local, regional, and international forces engaged in the Libyan file. In the context of continuing political and institutional division, a stalled electoral track, and the persistence of armed formations outside the framework of a unified national military institution, concerns are mounting over the possibility of renewed military tensions in the period ahead.
One of the most prominent risk factors is the continuation of the division between the political and security institutions in the east and west of the country. Despite the reduced probability of large-scale direct confrontation compared to previous years, the absence of a comprehensive political settlement still leaves many fundamental issues unresolved — including the future of executive authority, the mechanisms for distributing resources, and the form of security and military arrangements. This situation perpetuates a state of mutual distrust among the various parties, rendering any political crisis or local dispute liable to escalate into a security confrontation.
The multiplicity of armed formations also represents one of the most prominent sources of fragility. Many of these formations still retain their military structures, sources of financing, and local influence, despite some of them being integrated into state institutions or cooperating with the existing authorities. This means that the field balance of power continues to depend to a considerable degree on temporary understandings and shifting interests, rather than on a state monopoly over the use of force. Should these understandings come under strain, local clashes or conflicts among armed groups could re-emerge.
The economic factor stands out as one of the potential drivers of tension. Libya is almost entirely dependent on oil revenues, making the management and distribution of resources an extremely sensitive issue. Any disputes over oil income or public expenditure mechanisms could turn into a source of tension among the various political and military forces — particularly given the ongoing competition for influence within the main economic and financial institutions.
Beyond this, external interventions continue to constitute an influential factor in the Libyan scene. Despite a decline in the intensity of international polarisation compared to earlier periods, a number of regional and international powers still maintain security and military ties with various local actors. This reality has contributed to preventing a collapse of existing balances, but has at the same time made Libyan stability contingent on shifting external calculations. Any change in the priorities of these powers, or in the nature of their relationships with Libyan parties, could directly affect the security situation within the country.
The southern regions are also acquiring growing importance in the assessment of future risks. The Libyan south represents a convergence point between the crises of North Africa and the Sahel region, witnessing continuous activity by smuggling and organised crime networks, as well as the movements of cross-border armed groups. As the security deterioration continues in parts of the African Sahel, the likelihood of certain threats migrating into the Libyan interior increases — whether through arms flows, the movement of armed elements, or the expansion of illicit activities.
Added to this is the fact that the prolonged stalling of the political process may erode popular trust in the existing institutions and in the internationally supported negotiating tracks. In the absence of a clear political horizon, certain parties may resort to employing security or military pressure tools to improve their negotiating positions or impose new facts on the ground — a pattern that Libya has witnessed on more than one occasion since 2011.
Nevertheless, the prospects of a return to full-scale war remain lower than the prospects of limited tensions or sporadic local confrontations. Most Libyan actors are aware of the steep cost of any large-scale conflict, and the major external powers do not appear willing to slide into a new confrontation that would threaten their interests and political investments in the country. Yet this does not negate the fact that the continuation of political deadlock, institutional division, and the persistence of weapons outside the state's full control will leave the Libyan scene vulnerable to recurring security tremors.
Accordingly, the principal risk facing Libya in the coming period lies not so much in the return of all-out war as in the continuation of a state of fragile stability — in which any political, economic, or security crisis can ignite a new round of armed tensions. Achieving tangible progress on the political settlement track and the unification of security and military institutions therefore remains the most important condition for reducing the risks of sliding once again toward instability.
