Al-Qaeda’s attack on an army base in northern Burkina Faso on November 26 was a collosal failure. The operation, by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Front for the Victory of Islam and Muslims (known by its Arabic acronym JNIM), targeted the biggest army base in the north of the country, in the town of Djibo in the Soum region. It led to the killing of at least 100 of the group’s fighters.
But JNIM soon launched a string of successive attacks. In December, it assaulted a military barracks on the edge of the town of Nango, in Zogoré region, another base near the town of Balavé, and an army camp near the city of Kassan. Yet these attacks also failed.
Despite its inability to seize any of these bases, JNIM pulled back and reordered its ranks. Then, on the afternoon of January 1, the group staged a major attack on a military base near Nouna, a town in the northwestern province of Boucle du Mouhoun, which borders Mali.
The group brought in fighters from the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front (MLF), which has a reputation for ferocity in battle. It launched the attack with mortar and rocket shelling from several axes, and blew up three key electricity pylons around Nouna, cutting off power to most of the towns and cities in the area.
Around 200 jihadists then stormed the base of the 53rd Division from four sides, riding in cars and motorcycles, as well as attacking the town nearby.
Casualties were reportedly high on both sides: the JNIM-aligned MLF lost 20 fighters during the attack, while 15 others were injured, while some 30 soldiers were killed and 15 wounded. A further seven were captured.
The attack ended with the jihadists in control of both the town and the base. They also seized hundreds of Kalashnikov assault rifles, several medium-sized machine guns, some mortars and dozens of boxes of ammunition, as well as several four-wheel-drive cars and motorbikes.
New Strategies
After seizing the camp and raiding it for munitions, the MLF set fire to the base and withdraw. They now fled southwards, along a highway passing through the city of Bagala.
So why did the Nouna attack succeed, while JNIM’s previous operations had failed?
One major factor appears to be the lack of drones, which had likely played a role in repelling previous attacks and monitoring the militants’ movements. The group’s success was likely also related to its choice of target: the the 53rd Division camp was located far from the capital Ouagadougou, and close to areas straddling the border with Mali, where the group has a major presence. Furthermore, the January attack relied heavily on the MLF, predominantly made up of ethnic Fulani fighters. The base was in a Fulani-dominated area, meaning that as well as the lack of drone surveillance, there may not have been any intelligence leaks either, taking the military by surprise and hobbling its response.
The January attack came in the context of escalating jihadist activity in the deeply unstable Mali-Burkina Faso border region. JNIM has targeted numerous Malian and Burkinabè army bases since mid-November 2023. This campaign has included 10 attacks on various bases in Mali, in two cases seizing control of them temporarily before withdrawing. In the other eight attacks, the jihadists failed to take over the camps, and withdrew after fierce gun battles with the Malian army. In Burkina Faso, the organization attempted six times to storm military barracks in various parts of the country’s north, although only the Nouna attack was successful in reaching the inside of the base.
These attacks against Burkinabè military bases are likely to continue, and may move further south and closer to Ouagadougou. Such a scenario would suggest that the group has planted cells and strongholds in these parts of the country too.
