Mali officially produces over 60 tonnes of gold a year, bringing much-needed billions into the impoverished country—but fueling a growing rivalry between armed groups for control over the lucrative trade.
Russia’s Wagner militia, particularly, is taking a growing interest in managing gold exploration and mining operations in Mali as well as elsewhere in the Sahel. Since backing the Malian army in a campaign against Tuareg separatists in the north-eastern region of Kidal in August 2023, Wagner has turned its sights on gold-mining areas in the center and south of the country, as a means of collecting its dues from the Malian government in payment for its support in that and similar campaigns.
In November last year, Russia signed a preliminary deal with the country’s ruling junta to finance and build a gold refinery in the capital Bamako, that would produce 200 tonnes of gold annually—triple the country’s official output in 2022.
Four international companies currently operating in the field of gold exploration and mining in Mali: Canadian firms Barrick Gold and B2Gold, Australia’s Resolute Mining, and South African outfit AngloGold Ashanti.
Mali’s gold resources are the stuff of legend, responsible for medieval king Mansa Musa, seen as one of the richest people in history. Today, while some 70% of the metal comes from Mali’s southwest, the gold resources of northern Mali are mainly controlled by jihadist and separatist groups. Their output is hard to estimate.
Wagner has signed several agreements with the Malian government to invest in gold mining. In 2022, its co-founder Dmitry Utkin bought 78% of national gold-mining firm Marena Gold Mali. However, Wagner was hungry for more, and sought to impose its full control over major mines. On February 9 of this year, it seized the largest mine in northern Mali, near in the town of Intahaka in the state of Gao, sending a contingent of infantry and armored personnel carriers, backed with helicopters to take the mine by force.
The Intahaka mine had passed through the hands of multiple armed groups in recent years, including the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Front for the Victory of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and more recently the Imgad Tuareg militia, which had operated the mine whilst paying protection money to the jihadists for the past two years.
Wagner has used this strategy of seizing direct control of mineral resources in other African countries. In 2023, the group’s diamond and gold trading in the Central African Republic was worth about $2.5 billion, which it channeled through a network of intermediaries and mining companies that exploit loopholes in Western sanctions to sell gold and diamonds on global markets, thus reducing the impact of Western sanctions on Moscow.
The Wagner-Jihadist Gold Rush
Jihadist groups have also taken an intense interest in the mining and sale of gold. Locals report that as soon as reports emerge of new artisanal mines in eastern or southern Mali or northern Burkina Faso, fighters from whichever jihadist organization controls that area turn up and lay claim to the site, imposing royalties on anyone working there. The region is full of gold mines, both official and informal, which are today a key source of income for jihadist organizations in the deeply unstable border triangle between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali.
Therefore, after Wagner took control of the Intahaka mine, the Islamic State group’s Sahel branch rushed to impose its presence and demand a share in the facility’s profits. This began with an ambush on the Malian army some 55 kilometers from the mine, a day after Wagner took control of the site, which IS media claimed killed some 50 soldiers.
The group has also carried out other attacks against Wagner forces and the Malian army, most notably on February 16 of this year, when it targeted an army convoy and Wagner near the mine, killing six soldiers and two Wagner fighters as well as wounding a further 10 soldiers, according to local sources.
Sahel governments do not usually directly oversee gold mining operations on their territories. This has allowed the emergence of local militias and gangs that are able to control much of this trade. Al-Qaeda and IS have seen an opportunity here, offering to protect local communities from bandits and organized criminal gangs, in exchange for a share of the gold extracted in the region.
Hence, since around 2020, gold has risen to become the main source of income for these groups, which control their own mines or impose “taxes” on mine workers. They then sell the metal to merchants who smuggle it out of the country via neighboring countries such as Togo and Benin, or on direct flights from gold-rich Sahel states to other countries such as the United Arab Emirates.
The precious cargo is often hidden in hand luggage, and transporters pay bribes to airport employees to look away. Moreover, these groups provide protection to villages where young people work in mining, in turn creating a gateway for recruiting those young people into jihadist groups’ ranks.
It is clear that any move by Wagner moves to seize the dozens of small mines in areas under the influence of jihadist groups will spark escalating violence between the two. It will also push many young people to join these organizations, whose propaganda rails against the “new occupier” and the “helpers of tyranny,” calling on locals to defend “the blood and honor of the Muslims.”
This is only exacerbated by Wagner’s near-daily massacres of civilians in villages where it carries out inspections and raids.
The Russian paramilitary group’s drive to seize control of mines in areas under the influence of jihadist groups will also push these groups to escalate their attacks against both Wagner and government forces. Wagner will also see the activities of such organizations in informal gold mining areas as an incentive to expand its ow activities there. For example, Wagner has not hitherto been not active in the gold-rich areas of southwestern Mali’s Kayes state, but JNIM’s growing activity there since late 2023 offers Wagner an ideal pretext to expand its presence and take control of gold mines in the future.
Competition for control over gold mines and mining operations is only set to increase. This is likely to fuel further unrest in the region, increasing the likelihood of attacks on the mines themselves—and of massacres against the civilians who work there.
