When General Abdourahamane Tchiani deposed the country’s government in a July 2023 coup, the United Arab Emirates publicly condemned it, saying it was following developments in Niger with concern, stressing its “support for institutions and constitutional law” and talking of the need to “preserve security and stability in Niger.”
The UAE had also condemned, in the same tone, previous military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, calling for dialogue and efforts to preserve security in the Sahel. Yet despite making such statements in public, the UAE has acted quite differently behind the scenes.
Security sources told the Center for African Security Studies that Abu Dhabi played a key role in Niger coup, chiming with evidence that the Gulf state’s position has shifted on the coup in Mali. The UAE’s public condemnation of the coup has steadily faded, replaced by direct communication with the coup’s leader, Colonel Assimi Goïta. The coup in Burkina Faso has received little Emirati attention at all.
How do Mali and Niger differ in Emirati eyes?
Since their respective coups, many clues have emerged over the Emirati role in Mali and Niger. Goïta’s overthrow of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2020 cost the UAE a key ally, and publicly it voiced discontent at his overthrow. However, according to sources with knowledge of the matter, it later sent funds to the coup’s leader. This angered France, which opposed the coup, as Goïta has adopted an anti-French policy in managing the country.
On the other hand, Niger’s pre-coup leader President Mohamed Bazoum had annoyed the UAE. Sources told the Center for African Security Studies that he had rejected a UAE request for permission to set up a military base in the country’s north, prompting Abu Dhabi to back his rivals, just months before the coup that overthrew him in July 2023.
Strategic Goals in the Sahel
It seems that the UAE’s overall goal in the Sahel is focused on bolstering its influence in areas of competition with its Gulf rivals. Officials in Niger indicate that the country’s main goal in supporting the new authorities in Niger was to enable it better to monitor developments in Libya, Chad and Algeria.
A base in northern Niger would enable the UAE to support General Khalifa Haftar’s operations in Libya, by placing the Fezzan region in the country’s south Libya within the range of Emirati planes. It would also allow Abu Dhabi to monitor developments in Chad, which the UAE views as an unreliable ally. Chad’s Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno (Sr.) had caused consternation in Abu Dhabi in 2017 by first acceding to a request by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to cut ties with Qatar, then quickly retracting this decision and seeking to rebuild ties with Doha well before the Gulf boycott ended.
Another key goal behind the UAE’s drive to build the base is that it would enable it to monitor Algerian influence in the region. Algiers reportedly rejected all of Abu Dhabi’s requests for support during the Gulf standoff, the Yemen war, and the normalization process with Israel. Accordingly, the two have become rivals in the Sahel. Were Niger’s military junta and its president to agree to the base being built, the UAE would have the advantage of having a presence close to the Algerian border, enabling it to monitor movements of Algerian forces and Azawadi Tuareg groups Algiers backs in Mali, as well as its relations with jihadist groups active in that region. Algeria would see this monitoring as a threat to its own national security.
If the base is established and forces are deployed there, this will strengthen the UAE’s influence in other countries surrounding Niger too. They include Sudan, as the base would enable the UAE to directly supply the Rapid Support Forces and armed factions loyal to them with whatever weapons it saw fit. It would also help the UAE gather information about Sudanese armed factions moving between Sudan and Chad through the desert, whether through official or clandestine routes.
